Yielding to sustained criticism from feminists 1 and prosecutors, 2 New York State recently adopted legislation modifying the requirement that the testimony of a rape victim must be supported by additional evidence to sustain a conviction. 3 Critics had attacked this so-called corroboration requirement 4 as imposing a sexually discriminatory rule which severely inhibited convictions for the offense of rape.5 Although these groups had pressed for complete repeal of the requirement, the new measure was a compromise which retained significant portions of the old corroboration rule. 0 The retention of a modified rule in New York, and the recent adoption of similar statutes by other statesT are signs of the continuing vitality of the corroboration requirement. In these jurisdictions, the word of a rape victim must be supplemented by the testimony of other witnesses or by circumstantial evidence to sustain -the prosecution's case. In these same jurisdictions, and throughout the country, the word of the victim of a robbery, assault, or any other crime may alone constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
has dealt at any length with the justifications for the corroboration requirement-factors that are thought to make a rape charge different enough from an ordinary criminal case to warrant a special rule of evidence.
This Note will argue that such factors do not justify the corroboration rule, or other categorical rules of evidence establishing special requirements for rape prosecutions. It will suggest that the credibility of testimony from rape victims be left to juries, subject to the discretion of trial judges to intervene through directed verdicts or comments on the evidence. The Note will first summarize the history of the rule and its prevalence, substance, and effect in American jurisdictions. Second, it will systematically examine the premises which are considered justifications for the corroboration rule. Third, it will evaluate the need for the corroboration requirement in view of the traditional legal safeguards against false convictions. Fourth, it will critique possible alternatives to and modifications of the corroboration rule.
I. The Corroboration Requirement-Its History, Substance and Effect

A. History and Prevalence
Statements in the case law to the contrary, 9 Wigmore's research has made it clear that the corroboration requirement for charges of rape did not exist in the common law. 1 0 The common law made but one exception to the doctrine that the evidence of one witness may sustain a conviction, namely, the rule that the testimony of one witness, without corroborating circumstances, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for perjury' In prosecutions for rape and, in fact, for all sexual offenses committed upon women, the common law did not require corroboration.' 2 The Rape Corroboration Requirement Nonetheless, seven jurisdictions have adopted the rule-five by statute 1 3 and two by judicial decision' 4 -that the testimony of a female complainant must be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction for rape.' 5 On the other hand, thirty-five states have no such requirement, 16 14. Only two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Nebraska, appear to apply a full corroboration requirement in the absence of legislation. See p. 1369 infra. 148. Georgia's earlier common.law rule, the precursor of its present statutory rule, see note 13 supra, appears to have been adopted in the mistaken belief that it had been the prevailing rule in England. See Davis v. State, 120 Ga. 433, 435, 48 S.E. 180, 181 (1904) . In other states the imposition of the requirement may be linked to the reversal of the common.law rule e.cluding parties to a lawsuit from testifying. See, e.g., Mathews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 337, 27 N.1. 234, 237 (1886). Following this reversal, the courts could hear the defendant expressly deny the allegations of the complainant. At this time they adopted the rule that an accusation must be corroborated where the defendant denies the accusation of the complaining witness in a charge of rape. In still other states the requirement developed from the application to rape cases of the requirement that an) conviction must be based upon sufficient evidence; this requirement became formalized oser the course of decisions into a rule of law. In the District of Columbia, for example, Kidwell v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 566, 573 (1912) , which noted that those decisions affirming a conviction on the testimony of the complainant all involved cases in which there was corroborating circumstantial evidence, later became cited for the proposition that corroboration of the testimony of the complainant was required in cvcry case as a matter of law. See 
B. Substance
Among the fifteen states with some form of requirement, there is wide variation both as to the elements of the crime which must be corroborated and as to the evidence considered material for purposes of corroboration. Under New York's earlier law, corroboration was required for each material element of the offense-force, penetration, and identity of the accused. 1 9 The revised New York law removes the need for corroboration of identity, except for statutory rape, and leaves intact the requirement of corroboration of force. Corroboration of penetration is no longer required, but in its place is added a requirement of some "other evidence tending to . . . Sess., June 10, 1972, at 811. Apparently, then, there still must be some corroboration of the sexual nature of the assault; torn underwear, for example, probably would be sufficient, but facial trict of Columbia requires corroboration both of the corpus delicti (force and penetration) and of the identity of the accused, but the standard by which the adequacy of identifying evidence is determined is not as stringent as that required for proof of the offense itself. 2 1 Nebraska requires corroboration, not necessarily of the particular act constituting rape, but of material facts and circumstances which tend to support the testimony of the complainant. 22 Other states require only the most minimal corroboration of any particular aspect of the complainant's testimony.
3
No state requires direct eyewitness testimony to corroborate any element of the offense. 24 Force can be corroborated by physical signs of recent violent intercourse, 2 5 abandonment of articles of clothing by the victim, 26 the condition of her clothing, 2-7 her hysteria, 28 1 and in some states her prompt complaint to legal authorities. 20 Penetration is commonly corroborated by medical testimony based on a physical examination of the complainant, 3 0 but it also can be corroborated by pregnancy 3 ' or the subsequent birth of a child. 32 Identity of the accused can be corroborated by such evidence as his presence at the bruises would not. It is not difficult to imagine many instances in which corroboration sufficient to meet this statutory standard simply will not be available.
Early newspaper accounts of the new law erroneously minimized the extent of the corroboration requirement retained. See, e.g 
1-369
The 
C. Effect
In those states where a corroboration requirement has been enforced strictly, there has been at least one obvious effect-a comparatively low rate of conviction for rape. 38 The reasons for this phenomenon are Curiously, the percentage of adult prosecutions and the percentage of rape convictions were actually well above the national average in Georgia and Iowa, though they were below it in Nebraska. The higher conviction rates, relative to total offenses as well as to trials, in Georgia and Iowa cannot be explained by their enforcement of a corrobora tion requirement. It may be that these states have a conviction rate above the national average in similar crimes; or they may place greater emphasis by police and prosecttors on rape cases. Such explanations, however, are purely conjectural. In any event, repeal of the corroboration rule in these two states would probably not affect the conviction rate in a manner as dramatic as would elimination of it in New York. circumstantial evidence corroborating the complainant's identification of the accused is not likely to be available. 40 Such outdoor rapes also lack the broken furniture that often serves as corroboration of force in indoor rapes. 4 1 Frequently there is no circumstantial physical corroboration for the simple reason that no physical force was employed in the rape. 42° Menachem Amir's recent study of 646 forcible rapes reveals that many women, when confronted with a weapon-wielding assailant, make the sensible decision not to resist physically. 4 3 These women will lack the bruises and torn clothing that would othenise corroborate the assailant's use of force.
4 4 Likewise, most women douche after assault. 45 As a result, medical examination will rarely reveal the presence of sperm in the victim's vaginal secretions, and the possibility of medical corroboration of penetration diminishes. 40 For all these reasons the corroboration requirement will often virtually bar successful prosecution.
The corroboration requirement thus has an obvious potential for discriminatory effect. The crime of rape is unique among criminal offenses because it always involves a female complainant and a male defendant. 47 For this reason it has been suggested that the extra burden of corroboration may be an instance of the law's unequal treatment of women. 48 In rebuttal, others have argued that the corroboration requirement is not antifeminist since it applies also to sodomy cases, 47. The sexual element of a rape also gives it a distinctive daracteristic. Some victims, however, are more upset over the beating that accompanied the rape, The Story of Maxwell Kent-Rapist, Washington Post, June 18, 1967, § C, at 1, col. 4, or even over the theft of a purse or other personal property, J. MAcDONALD, RAPE: 01-FENDERS AND THEIR VIcrMMS 96 (1971), than over the rape itself.
48. Younger, supra note 8, at 276 n.105. This sexist aspect may cien raise consti. tutional issues. New York's revised corroboration law is thought by snome to be a denial to women of equal protection of the laws; the contention is that wvomncn are not getting the same deterrent effect from the law as men. See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1972, § 4, at 5, col. 5. which may involve male victims, as well as to rape cases. 40 Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of such "sex crimes" involve female victims and male assailantsO so the abstract consistency of treatment by no means establishes sexual impartiality of a corroboration rule in practice.
As a result of its negative effect on successful prosecutions for rape, as well as its implied mistrust of one form of female testimony, the corroboration requirement has been criticized by some courts. 6 1 Yet, within the past four years at least two states have adopted or substantially broadened statutes preventing a man from being convicted for rape on the uncorroborated testimony of a woman.5 2 The recent statutory revision in New York," 3 rather than representing a counter trend, should be viewed as a tactical retreat from an extreme form of the corroboration requirement which had made convictions for rape virtually unobtainable.5 A third state, Washington, is presently considering the adoption of a revised criminal code which includes a corroboration requirement. The Rape Corroboration Requirement
II. Justifications for a Corroboration Requirement
The justifications propounded in favor of an exceptional corroboration requirement in charges of rape are threefold: first, the frequency of false charges of rape; second, the emotion raised in a jury by a charge of rape; and, third, the difficulty in disproving an accusation of rape.
A. Frequency of False Rape Charges
It is generally believed that false accusations of sex crimes in general, and rape in particular, are much more common than untrue charges of other crimes. 5 z A number of different motives may prompt a deliberately falsified accusation of rape. A woman may consent to sexual intercourse with a man, then feel ashamed of herself and bitter at her partner, and bring charges of rape against him.ao Or, she may have become pregnant and accuse an entirely innocent party for the purpose of shielding the man who actually caused her pregnancy. 5 7 A woman may falsify charges for the purpose of blackmail. that what she swore on the former trial was false; that she had already become a girl of bad character at the time the plaintiff in error had relations with her, and that she was induced to make false statements by her mother to enable the latter to force money from plaintiff in error, and also to break up the criminal relations existing between him and her sister Maggie; that is to separate them, so that her mother could obtain money by using Maggie as a lure for other men. In Martinez v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. 572, 573, 59 SAV.2d 410 (1933) , there was evidence introduced that the mother of the complainant had attempted to negotiate a settlement with the defendant in return for the dropping of charges.
Medical personnel are thought to be particularly" vulnerable to such blackmail: Many accusations of rape have been made against ph)sicians and dentists. There are several factors, however, which discourage accusations of rape, whatever their motive. For example, there are the stigma that attach to the victim of an incident culturally defined as sordid, 01 and the humiliation caused by some forms of publicity associated with such charges. 2 Also to be considered are the necessity of confronting the assailant 0 3 and the reluctance to face the barbs and insinuations of the defense attorney. 0 4 There is, in addition, the fear of retaliation from the accused rapist or his friends.6 Finally, there is the deterrent effect of the existence of the corroboration requirement itself, at least to the extent that a potential complainant may be aware of it.
These disincentives are so powerful that many real victims of rape avoid reporting incidents. Statistics indicate that rape is "one of the most under-reported crimes ... ."" The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1967 estimated that forcible rapes exceeded by more than three and a half times the 61. Rape seems to arouse in most people a feeling of disgust, perhaps generated by the repressions surrounding aggressive sex; and the disgust may spread to the body of the victim who is somehow thought to be contaminated by the experience. Women's descriptions of their rape experiences related at a "Speak.Out on Rape" organized by New York City women's groups in 1970 illustrated the humiliation which comes from simply reporting a rape to the police:
Police reactions described at the meeting were a sorry lot. For an account of a typical rape situation as told by the victim to a journalist, see The Story of Maxwelt Kent-Rapist, supra note 47, at 1, col. 1. Perhaps the most striking feature of this account is the callousness of the police toward the victim.
63. The embarrassment of the victim in relating the details of her assault In a public trial may be reduced with no harm to the accused by conducting the trial with less publicity than cases ordinarily are. For example, the trial may be held in the petit jury room rather than the larger court room. reported rate. 6 7 Other estimates of the percentage of rapes actually reported run as low as five per cent 0 s or even lower., Even if she reports the offense, a complaining witness may refuse to prosecute, in large part to avoid having to relive a traumatic and humiliating experience for the benefit of the judge and jury. A study in Detroit, for example, showed that in nearly thirty-three per cent of the rape offenses reported to the police, the complainant subsequently refused to prosecute her assailant, and charges had to be dropped.
0
It might be thought that the disincentives which cause such gross under-reporting do not deter those motivated to make false accusations. Perhaps motives such as blackmail or revenge are stronger than the desire to see one's assailant brought to justice and are more likely to overcome a woman's reluctance to face the humiliation and publicity that follow a report of rape. Such conjecture is impossible to disprove. On balance, however, there is strong reason to doubt that a large number of women will use a rape charge as a vehicle for blackmail or revenge.
7 ' The number will almost certainly be so small that modem techniques of criminal investigation 2 and traditional legal rules, other than the corroboration requirement, will effectively protect innocent defendants. 7 3 There is, moreover, no requirement for corroboration of other crimes, including physical assaults, which are equally subject to intentional falsification and lack many of the disincentives which discourage rape accusations. The possibility of deliberate falsification, alone, cannot justify the corroboration requirement as a special rule of evidence in rape cases. 71. A woman bent on blackmail or revenge also may choose a rape charge because of its relative ease of fabrication. Even if she stands a slim chance of success, in the sense of obtaining a conviction, the typically severe punishment for rape makes the stakes high, see p. 1381 infra, and an unsuccessful rape prosecution probably still Lxacts a greater toll in embarrassment from the defendant than would a trial for another criminal charge.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
In estimating the frequency of these deliberate falsifications of rape, the 'adiantages" of a rape accusation must be balanced against its "disadvantages"-the embarrassment and publicity incident to a report of rape, see p. 1374 supra, and the difficulty in obtaining a conviction. See p. 1379 infra. Although weighing these imponderables is highly conjectural, it seems likely that a woman bent upon blackmail or revenge would be inclined to choose a more effective and less embarrassing tactic. But false rape charges need not be deliberate. A false rape charge can be provoked "by a woman's honest and understandable confusion over what was done to her, or by whom. 7 4 Even if it be conceded that the reliability of a rape victim's testimony may be reduced by the shock of her experience, is her credibility so much more suspect than that of any other victim of a violent physical assault as to warrant a dis. tinctive rule of evidence? Street crimes of all types can raise serious problems of identification; yet the law does not demand corroboration of the victim's testimony to sustain a conviction for them.
A more serious problem, however, is raised by the false rape charge rooted in pure fantasy. 5 A woman may convincingly represent a fantasized attack as an actual event. 7 6 Such charges may be relatively invulnerable to ordinary law enforcement investigation and to impeachment through cross-examination. Many psychiatrists and physicians once considered fantasies of rape to be extremely common among women. 78 Dr. Karl A. Menninger has said that such fantasies are so common that they may be considered universal. 79 The most frequent explanation for these fantasies is that they represent "an unrealized wish or unconscious, deeply suppressed sex-longing or thwarting." 80 According to this theory, "the normal woman who has such a fantasy does not confuse it with reality, but it is . .. easy for some neurotic individuals to translate their fantasies into actual beliefs and memory falsifications . . .. "I Perhaps the most carefully considered theory that purports to explain these fantasies has been propounded by the psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch. She assimilated rape fantasies to a theory of female masochism, 8 2 a corollary to Freud's concept of "penis envy." 8 3 She contended that fantasies of violent sexual intercourse without consent are 74 a manifestation of the "attraction of suffering [that] is incomparably stronger for women than for men." 8 1 4 Because the theories of penis envy and female masochism are rooted in the physiology of women and hence are considered characteristic of "normal" female psychology, Deutsch's theory predicts a high frequency of rape fantasies, many of which become public accusations.sa Deutsch's theory, however, has been largely discredited in recent years. 8 6 Some have criticized her, as well as Freud, for using clinical experience with abnormal patients to derive theories of normal female psychology. 8 7 Others have criticized her for failing to consider the social context in which women live. 86 The effect of any biological characteristic is very strongly conditioned, perhaps even dominated, 8 9 by the culture-complex in which the particular woman has developed. If these cultural factors are considered, and if today's culture is compared with that in which Freud and even Deutsch developed their theories, the incidence of female masochism very likely will be far less than it may ever have been in the past.°0 Compared to the influence of the social context within which a perso lives, his or her history or "traits," as well as biological makeup may simply be random variations, "noise" superimposed on the true signal which can predict behavior. 90. Karen Homey, a neo-Freudian psychoanal)st, suggests several social factors whidt predispose to the appearance of female masochism:
1. Blocking of outlets for expansiveness and sexuality; 2. Restriction in the number of children, inasmuch as having and rearing children supplies the woman with various gratifying outlets (tenderness, achievement, self-esteem), and this becomes all the more important when having and rearing children is the measuring rod of social evaluation; 3. Estimation of women as beings who are, on the whole, inferior to men (insofar as it leads to a deterioration of female self-confidence); 4. Economic dependence of women on men or on family, inasmuch as it fosters an emotional adaptation in the way of emotional dependence; 5. Restriction of women to spheres of life that arc built chiefly upon emotional bonds, such as family life, religion, or charity work; 6. Surplus of marriageable women, particularly when marriage offers the principal opportunity for sexual gratification, children, security, and social recognition.
K. HORNEY, supra note 87, at 230.
An analysis of these factors suggests that the frequency of occurrence of female masochism will decline as inhibitions on female sexual expression are lifted, as women Thus, whatever may have been the former validity of the theory that female masochism will lead women to fantasize rape incidents, its currency today has been largely eroded, and will be increasingly eroded as women acquire social, legal and economic equality with men. Insofar as the corroboration requirement in rape cases has been justified by the danger of false rape charges brought by fantasizing women, it is linked to a psychological theory that fails to take into account the changing role of women in American society.
No doubt, a small number of women may fantasize rapes; but this fact alone is an insufficient basis for a rigid corroboration rule. Rather than create a general rule of evidence to protect potential defendants from a few psychotic complainants, such a problem can best be handled on an ad hoc basis by trial judges and reviewing courts as it is for other criminal charges.91
B. Emotion Raised by a Charge of Rape
The second explicit justification for a corroboration requirement in rape cases is the suspicion that in such cases the presumption of innocence to which a defendant is legally entitled is likely to give way to "the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female .
-2 This alleged danger of unfair prejudice against the defendant in a rape case has two elements. It is believed that "the heinousness of the offense" may transport "the judge and the jury with so much indignation that they are hastily carried to the conviction of the person accused . . . ."93 Also, juries are thought to be "preinclined to believe a man guilty of any illicit sexual offense he may be charged with, and it seems to matter little what his previous reputation has been." 0 4 acquire legal, economic and educational equality with men, as the economic dependence of women on men and the family is lifted, as restrictions upon female employmnent and community involvement disappear, and as marriage and the family cease to be the exclusive foci of female life. Clara Thompson, another neo-Freudian psychoanalyst, argues further that many of these cultural changes have occurred and that, as a result, "a new type of woman Is emerging, a woman . . . whose characteristics differ from those described by Freud." C. TnmOMPSON This second justification can be evaluated on the basis of existing empirical evidence. Are rape convictions, in fact, easier to obtain than convictions for other offenses? Do juries get swept away in a fit of passion and hastily convict men on the likely-sounding testimony of women who allege sexual assaults?
Kalven and Zeisel's exhaustive empirical study of criminal juries in America reveals that convictions for "non-aggravated rape"03 are extraordinarily rare. 9 6 This same study shows that juries, in their efforts to acquit defendants of rape charges, have created a special extra-legal defense-contributory behavior on the part of the complainant. 7 When the jury perceives that the complainant somehow assumed the risk of rape, 98 it will attempt to find the defendant guilty of some lesser crime or, if this option is not available, acquit him totally.°9
The finding that rape convictions are difficult to obtain should be no surprise to experienced criminal attorneys. Rape trials are often heard before largely male juries' 0 0 which are considered to be unsympathetic to the prosecution, especially in cases where the complainant and the defendant knew each other prior to the alleged rape.1 0 1 Thus, the existing evidence indicates that juries view rape charges 95. "Aggravated rape," a generic term of art used by Kahen and Zeisel, includes all cases in which there is evidence of extrinsic violence or in which there are several as. sailants or in which the defendant and the victim were complete strangers at the time of the event. "Simple rape" (which for purposes of clarity will be referred to as "non- 
96.
The jury convicted defendants of rape in just three of the forty.two cases of non-aggravated rape studied by Kalven and Zeisel, whereas the judge would have convicted in twenty-two of these. Id. 253-54. The conviction rate is too low to be attributable to the corroboration requirement itself. See p. 1383 and note 124 infra.
97.
Id. 249-54. 98. Assumption of risk took the form of such behavior as acconpanying the defendant to his house or allowing him to accompany her to hers, joining the defendant at a beer-drinking party, or merely having given birth to an illegitimate child in the past. Id. 249 with extraordinary suspicion and rarely return convictions in the absence of aggravating circumstances, such as extrinsic violence.
10
In one instance, however, the danger of extreme emotions cannot be dismissed. This is the situation in which a black man has been accused of raping a white woman, and the case is heard before a predominately white jury. In such circumstances, several hundred black men have been convicted and executed, 1 03 particularly in the South. 104 Here, perhaps, there is some merit to the contention that the presumption of innocence may crumble under the rage of the jury. There are means more appropriate and effective'" 3 than the corroboration requirement, however, for dealing with these relatively infrequent cases. 10 6 Congress has long provided a criminal sanction for excluding blacks from jury service because of their race;' 0 ' and a criminal conviction of a black cannot stand under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is based on an indictment of a grand jury' 0 8 or a conviction by a petit jury' 0 9 from which blacks were excluded by reason of their race. 173-226 (1960) , one of the best known fictional representations of a false rape charge brought by a white woman against a black man in a southern town. A corroboration requirement wotld not have aided the innocent defendant in this case since the alleged victim's testimony was substan' tially corroborated by that of her father, both as to the corpus delicti and as to the identity of the accused.
106. M. AMIR, supra note 42, at 44, reports that in the 646 rape events studied, seventy-seven per cent involved a black victim and a black offender; eighteen per cent) a white victim and a white offender; four per cent, a black victim and a white offender; and a mere three per cent, a white victim and a black offender.
107.
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude; and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not more than $5,000. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1970).
108. is localized, he may be entitled to a change of venue. 11 0 Where an obviously biased jury has failed to believe strong evidence of innocence, the presiding judge or the appellate court can and must set aside the verdict." 1 Thus, the corroboration requirement is neither the only nor the best means for dealing with the problem of a racially inflamed jury.
The apparent suspicion of juries toward non-aggravated rape charges, at least in the absence of racial factors, may be buttressed by their recognition that very severe penalties accompany a conviction for rape. Sixteen states still prescribe capital punishment for rape.1" 2 In the remainder, long prison sentences are the rule, frequently with lengthy minimum terms. 113 When England in the early nineteenth century had a list of some 230 capital offenses, juries felt that the death penalty was so disproportionate for most crimes that they refused to convict.
1 4 Likewise, today, juries may find the penalty for rape (in the absence of excessive violence) or for statutory rape"1 so excessive that they refuse to return a conviction for rape" 0 6 although they find the defendant's conduct reprehensible. Insofar as this balancing of the offense against the penalty occurs in jury deliberations over rape cases, it constitutes additional evidence to refute the notion that juries are This tendency of juries to refuse to convict a man of rape if the) feel that the punishment is too severe is a strong argument against lengthy minimum sentences for rape. particularly because these sentences do not seem to have a deterrent effect upol the commission of rapes. swept away emotionally by the cry of a woman that she has been sexually assaulted.
C. Difficulty in Defending Against an Accusation of Rape
The third explicit justification for a corroboration requirement in rape cases is the imagined difficulty encountered by an innocent man in defending himself from an accusation of rape. In the famous words of Lord Chief Justice Hale, rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent." 17 The problem has been most precisely stated by a student Note writer:
If the defendant was never alone with the prosecutrix at all, he may be fortunate enough to have an alibi. But if he has not, or if the prosecution. can show that he was with her when the crime allegedly occurred, how is he to establish that he never achieved penetration, or that she consented?"" Rape charges are peculiar, though not unique, in this respect-the issue of whether or not a crime was even committed may turn solely on the conflicting testimony of the complainant and the defendant.'" The corroboration requirement, in effect, is a prior determination that if the prosecution's case stands solely on the testimony of the complainant, the defendant shall win.
In order to evaluate the effect of such a determination, two questions must be answered: first, how many rape cases rely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant and, second, how do juries customarily resolve these cases in the absence of a corroboration requirement?
As to the first question, Kalven and Zeisel's study shows that in not one of the seventy-two rape cases encountered in their sample did the prosecution rely only on the testimony of the complainant. -0 Although eyewitnesses were rare,' 2 ' police testified in the majority of 117. 1 M. HALE, supra note 93, at 635.
118. Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, supra note 8, at 1139.
119. Conviction on a perjury charge, for which the common law did rcqttlre corroboration, see p. 1366 supra, also may turn solely on the conflicting testimony of two witnesses. There are, of course, other crimes that may rely solely upon the testimony of the victim for which corroboration is not required. See, c.g., Duncan v. LottIsiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968) in which the appellant, a black man, was convicted of simple battery committed upon a white man. In this case the testimony of the victim was corroborated by his companions, but such corroboration was not a legal necessity for conviction.
120. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISE., supra note 39, at 141.
121. See note 39 supra.
trials, and there was testimony of family and friends of the complainant or of experts in many. 12 2 Overall, the average number of prosecution witnesses was 6.3.123 Although the study does not describe the content of each witness's testimony, and, thus, we do not know whether this testimony corroborated the victim's, these statistics suggest that uncorroborated testimony of the complainant is rare indeed. To some degree this apparent paucity of non-corroborated rape cases may be a product of the corroboration rule itself; but because Kalven and Zeisel's cases were drawn from the entire nation and because only a handful of jurisdictions impose a rigorous corroboration requirement, the existence of such rules probably did not significantly affect their findings.
2 4 Also, these findings are consistent with recent articles which have shown the reluctance of police to proceed further with rape accusations that will stand on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, even in jurisdictions without a corroboration requirement.
-
The answer to the second question-how do juries decide those rape charges based on the unsupported testimony of the victim?-is also suggested by Kalven and Zeisel's findings. As noted earlier, juries overwhelmingly acquit men accused of rape in the absence of aggravating circumstances. 12 "° Those rape cases in which there is an absence of aggravating circumstances are more likely to be those cases in which corroboration is either minimal or absent entirely. 12 To the extent this is so, juries would seem less likely to convict a man on the basis of a woman's ipse dixit claim of rape.
S
Thus, the available empirical evidence suggests that the difficulty of defending against an uncorroborated rape accusation, is far less than the difficulty in prosecuting one successfully. The female victim of a 127. Evidence of extrinsic violence, for example, would be corroborative of the element of force. See note 25 supra. However, there still might be corroboration in such forms as medical evidence of penetration or police testimony as to the prompt complaint or hysteria of the victim. See p. 1369 supra.
128. See Younger, supra note 8, at 276.
sexual assault who lacks evidence to corroborate her story is unlikely to persuade the police and prosecuting attorney to prosecute her assailant. And even if the man is prosecuted, the jury is extremely unlikely to convict him of rape.
III. The Argument for Reform
The available evidence indicates that relatively few uncorroborated rape accusations result in a trial, much less a conviction, even in the absence of a formal corroboration requirement. The issue thus focuses on the disposition of those relatively few rape cases in which the complainant's testimony is uncbrrbborated but a jury would still convict if permitted to do so. Does the danger of false convictions in these cases warrant the imposition of a corroboration rule? On balance, it does not. In a particular case the absence of corroboration may call for an ad hoc judicial determination that there is insufficient evidence upon which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But a prior legislative or judicial determination that corroboration is mandatory in all rape cases is a blunderbuss approach. 12 9 It depends upon the assumption that eveiy uncorroborated rape charge is sufficiently different from uncorroborated charges of other crimes to warrant a distinctive rule of evidence.
A rape charge does have some distinctive characteristics. The penalties upon conviction are inordinately severe. 130 The mere accusation, even if the prosecution is unsuccessful, may damage a defendant's reputation and livelihood far more deeply than would prosecution for another crime. Yet, the gravity of the offense alone cannot justify the requirement in view of the severity of penalty for other crimes for which no corroboration is required. 1 31 Neither the supposed distinctiveness of rape as a crime, nor the explicit justifications for the corroboration requirement, are sufficient reason for a categorical rule of evidence precluding conviction on the unsupported testimony of a complainant. The explicit justifications-the possibility of falsification,' 3 2 the emotion raised by the rape charge, 133 of defending against the accusation' 3 4 -are largely without merit. The serious defects in the rule's rationale, coupled with its negative effect upon successful prosecutions, 135 would seem to warrant repeal of the requirement in any form. 1 30 Repeal will not leave the innocent defendant without protection against the false charges of a lying or deluded complainant. In large part the goals and purposes of the corroboration requirement are served by two ordinary safeguards in our criminal law-the jury trial and the judge's power to set aside or direct a verdict based on insufficient evidence. 37 First, "Dj]uries are not ignorant; they look with suspicion on ipsc dixit complaints of sexual misconauct . . ."38 Wignore argues that "a rule of law requiring corroboration has probably little actual influence upon the jurors' minds over and above that ordinary caution and suspicion which would naturally suggest itself for such charges . 39Kalven and Zeisel's findings suggest that the "ordinary caution and suspicion" of the jury is heightened in cases of non-aggravated rape. 140 The jury trial thus remains a potent screen against the success of any rape charge.' 41 Second, the purposes of the rule of corroboration are further served by the judge's power to set aside or direct a verdict based on insubstantial evidence.' 4 1 2 Judges frequently set aside verdicts in jurisdictions having no statutory rule upon the same kind of evidence which would be insufficient under the corroboration rule in other jurisdictions.' 43 The difference in effect between the substantial evidence rule and a corroboration requirement varies with the content and interpretation of the particular requirement. New York's earlier statutory corrob- Hence, the number of guilty men "freed" by corroboration rules may be large in some states yet small in others, varying with the form of the corroboration rule imposed.
Conceding that the corroboration requirement permits some guilty men to escape punishment where corroboration is unavailable, some commentators have argued that this effect is consistent with one of the main thrusts of Anglo-American criminal law-the protection of the innocent. 146 However, the balance between convicting the guilty and safeguarding the rights of the innocent-a balance which our criminal jurisprudence traditionally has struck in favor of protecting the innocent14 7 -seems to be set so far in favor of acquittal in rape cases (even in the absence of a formal corroboration rule) that its removal will still leave the innocent well protected.' 48 
IV. Alternatives and Modifications to the Corroboration Rule
A. Alternatives
Legal commentators, courts, and legislatures have considered a number of measures designed to replace the corroboration requirement and protect men from the danger of a conviction based on an unfounded charge of rape. Perhaps the most common suggestion has been that the complainant in a rape case be subjected to a mandatory . 1971) . In effect, the argument of this Note is that the nature of rape charges does not warrant givihg the accused in such a case any "special advantage" not enjoyed by defendants charged with other crimes. The corroboration requirement dramatically shifts the balance of advantage in favor of the defendant and against the state in prosecution of rape charges, The balance should be seen as one involving the accused and the state, not the accused and the complainant.
examination by a competent psychiatrist. 149 Less common has been the recommendation that a physical examination of the complainant be compulsory in order to reveal fabricated accusations of rape. 1 50 Other commentators have suggested that all complainants in rape cases undergo a lie detector interrogation.15 1 The Model Penal Code proposed that American courts follow the rule existing in England and Canada whereby, in any prosecutions of a sex felony before a jury, the jury is given a special instruction, cautioning it to evaluate the testimony of the victim with special care in view of his or her emotional involvement and the difficulty in determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private. 1 5 2 The Model Penal Code also proposed a requirement that, in order for a prosecution for a sex offense to be instituted or maintained, notice of the alleged illegal offense must be brought to the attention of the police within three months after its occurrence15 3 All of these suggestions, however, are like the corroboration requirement itself in depending on the premise that an accusation of 149. Wigmore is the leading proponent of a rule whereby no sex offense charge could go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup has been examined and testified to by a qualified physician. (1947) .
The notion that the victim's failure to report the offense promptly reflects upon the substance of the accusation can be traced back at least as far as Lord Hale: Failure of the party ravished to make "fresh discovery and pursuit of the offcnse . . . carries [with it] a presumption that her suit is but malicious and feigned .... 1 A. ALE, sulpra note 93, at 632. rape is so different from any other accusation as to warrant a categorical rule of evidence rather than reliance on the discretion of the trial judge and the common sense of the jury. As this Note has suggested, the three major justifications for distinguishing between rapes and other crimes (for evidentiary purposes) are strongly suspect; consequently there seems little reason for trading one peculiar rule for another. 154 As with corroboration, in an individual case a judge may find that the nature of the charge and the characteristics of the complainant require that a psychiatric examination of her should be directed before prosecution can proceed. 1 'r Or he may hold that her failure to report the rape promptly to the police renders her testimony insufficiently reliable to sustain a conviction. But rape cases as a class do not warrant a hard-and-fast rule requiring psychiatric examination of the complainant or prompt complaint or any other uniquely applicable practice.
B. Child Complainants
Even if the corroboration requirement should be abolished in its application to adult complainants, some have proposed that it be retained in its application to charges of statutory rape.5 0 It has been thought by many that the dangers of unfounded rape charges are particularly common and dangerous when made by children.";' This contention has several elements. The mystery and fascination of sexual activity, combined with children's greater imagination, makes them more likely to fabricate an accusation of rape.l"S Also, a child's charge 154. Insofar as some alternatives to the corroboration rule have independent jtstiflcation, they may have greater validity. For example, the prompt complaint requirement, see p. 1387 supra, rests on the premise that one who has been subjected to an act of violence is unlikely to delay reporting the offense. To the extent that this prenise Is accurate, the rule may be a sound one, although logically it should be extended to require prompt complaint by victims of all physical assaults.
155. See 313 (1966) , in which the court held that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. Standards the court laid down for establishing whether or not a reason was compelling were: (I) little or no evidence in support of the charge, and (2) indication that the complainant's mental or emotional condition might affect her veracity.
156. For charges of statutory rape where lack of consent results from the victim's age alone, New York's revised corroboration law has a separate provision requiring corroboration of the identity of the assailant. Law of May 22, 1972, ch. 373, § 1, NX. Sess. Law News, 195th Sess., June 10, 1972, at 811-12.
157. "Unfounded accusations of rape are particularly apt to come from young children." M. PLoscowE, supra note 59, at 187.
158.
It is well recognized that children are more highly suggestive than adults. Sexual activity, with the aura of mystery that adults create about it, confuses and of rape is likely to incorporate the hostilities of both mother and child; 1 19 this process may be quite unintentional on the part of the mother, 160 or it may be intentional, the mother using her child as a tool for blackmail' 6 ' or revenge. 162 Finally, jurors are thought to be particularly prone to believe and sympathize with an infant victim, 10 3 just as they are considered predisposed to believe the claims of an allegedly sexually attacked woman. 4 For these reasons, many jurisdictions apply the corroboration requirement solely or with special rigor when the complainant is a child, : 0 3 though this reaction is by no means universal. 60 Even if it be conceded that there is a greater danger of a child fabricating a charge of rape and of a jury believing it, imposing a rule of law that all such testimony be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction is a crude response. 07 In most states, there are general common law or statutory provisions dealing with the testimony of children. If examination of the child reveals an insufficient capacity fascinates them. Moreover, they have, of course, no real understanding of the serious consequences of the charges they make. 160. There are cases in which a mother discovers that her little girl has a vaginal discharge or bleeds from the vagina at an age when the first menstruation is not yet expected. She may suspect a sexual assault on her child and interrogate the little girl and by either frightening her or by awakening the child's pseudologia phantasticia, start the child to romancing and confessing a sexual assault on her, which story is without foundation. 167. WVigmore argued that the rule of corroboration in its entirety is a "crude and childish measure ...." 7 J. WiroRE, supra note 10, § 2061, at 354. to observe, remember and recount, he may be disqualified from testifying, 168 his unswom statement may be taken, 100 or his testimony may be admitted with a cautionary instruction to the jury. 1 7 0 The specific danger of a woman using her child's perjured testimony as a weapon against a man is not unique to sex crimes' 7 1 and is detectable through conventional police and defense investigations.' 7 2 Also, evidence is lacking that juries have a distinctive tendency to believe a child complainant in sex crimes. 1 7 3 Furthermore, there are unique problems encountered in attempting to corroborate a charge of statutory rape. Since children "may not know to resist," there often is not corroborating evidence of the criminal act. 74 Also, corroborating a charge of statutory rape may be especially difficult in courts reluctant to accept mere opportunity to commit the crime as sufficient corroboration of identity. 175 The problem of false testimony from a child complainant, like that of false testimony from an adult, is best met by a thorough exploration of the witness's credibility-the ability to observe, to recollect, to narrate, and to do so with veracity. 7 0 This process is certainly more difficult than resort to a categorical rule, but it is, nonetheless, a particularly appropriate means of dealing with the mix of truth and fantasy that may comprise the testimony of a child.
V. Conclusion
Legislatively or judicially created rules requiring that the testimony of a complainant must be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction for rape should be abandoned. None of the justifications for treating rape cases differently from other criminal charges stands on solid empirical or theoretical footing. Replacing the corroboration requirement with an alternative rule-requiring psychiatric or physical examination of the complainant, for example, or a report of the alleged rape to the police within a certain period of time-is equally unjustified in the absence of an independent reason for treating rape accusations distinctively. Limiting the application of the corroboration rule to rape charges involving child complainants, although arguably more justified than a broad corroboration rule, is still less desirable than a thorough evaluation of a particular child's credibility.
The absence of corroboration in an individual case-perhaps even in most cases-may well call for a holding that there is insufficient evidence upon which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But this is a decision properly made on an ad hoc basis by the trial judge, weighing all the facts and inferences of the evidence introduced in a particular case. The corroboration rule may be based plausibly on the laudable purpose of protecting the innocent against false accusations; but this is a purpose of criminal procedure to be fulfilled in all cases. If the traditional safeguards are not functioning properly to fulfill that purpose, the solution lies in reform of criminal procedure as a whole, not in a special rule for cases involving the crime of rape.
